Taiwan. The Birth of A Nation? by Muyard, Frank
 China Perspectives 
53 | May- June 2004
Varia
Taiwan. The Birth of A Nation?
The recent presidential election witnessed the rise of Taiwanese national
identity and a further failure of the Kuomintang
Frank Muyard
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/2932
DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.2932
ISSN : 1996-4617
Éditeur
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 1 mai 2004
ISSN : 2070-3449
 
Référence électronique
Frank Muyard, « Taiwan. The Birth of A Nation? », China Perspectives [En ligne], 53 | May- June 2004,
mis en ligne le 29 décembre 2008, consulté le 28 octobre 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
chinaperspectives/2932  ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.2932 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 28 octobre 2019.
© All rights reserved
Taiwan. The Birth of A Nation?
The recent presidential election witnessed the rise of Taiwanese national
identity and a further failure of the Kuomintang
Frank Muyard
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 On March 20th 2004, President Chen Shui-bian and his running mate Lu Hsiu-lien, who
were the candidates of the Democratic Progressive Party (Minjindang, DPP) were re-
elected to the presidency of the Republic of China, defeating Lien Chan, President of the
Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), and his running mate, Soong Chu-yu,
President  of  the  PFP,  People  First  Party  (Qinmindang).  The  victory  margin  was
extremely narrow, barely more than 29,500 votes, or 0.22% of voters, separating them.
This  tiny  difference  and  the  attempted  assassination  of  the  President  and  Vice-
President the day before the ballot, the motives for which are still unknown, left the
losers, until then convinced of their victory, incredulous. 
2 That  Lien  and  Soong  refused  to  recognise  the  result,  their  decision  to  contest  its
validity in the courts, and the series of public demonstrations and protests that they
have organised, have tended to mask not only the meaning of Chen’s victory, but also
the factors that led to Lien and Soong’s defeat. The ballot recount, requested by all
parties, was put back until mid-May on account of the legal path chosen by the KMT
and the series of technical quibbles that it raised. Chen’s victory, officially proclaimed
on April 26th by Taiwan’s Central Electoral Commission (CEC), should not be in doubt.
All independent observers and the majority of political leaders, including those of the
KMT, remarked on the quality and the transparency of the election process, leaving
little room for error and even less for fraud1. It seems therefore that the re-election of
Chen Shui-bian, who gave his inaugural address on 20 May, is not in question.
3 Attempting to interpret its significance, two fundamental factors appear to be behind
this  victory.  One  is  a  marked  rise  in  the  Taiwanese  national  consciousness  and  a
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progressive  political  programme  of  institutional  and  constitutional  reforms.  The
election may have been “A vote on China”2, but it was also a “vote on Taiwan” and a
“vote on the reforms”, that is to say on the type of state and society desired by the
population.  The  programmes  of  both  camps  presented  the  electors  with  markedly
opposed  visions.  On  the  DPP  side,  a  reform policy  taking  Taiwanese  society  even
further from the past model and practices of the KMT regime and which offers the
possibility for a new national construction based on local history and culture and the
democratic expression of the individual. On the side of the KMT and its ally the PFP, the
return to the proven model of political and economic management of the state and
society though the apparatus of the KMT and the competence of its experts in the name
of  economic  well-being  and  social  stability,  associated  with  keeping  a  Chinese
nationalist ideology and a vision of relations between government and individuals that
is more technocratic than democratic. While the presidential election may well have
been about “China”, this vote thus also included a choice in domestic politics between,
on the one hand a  continuity  of  political  experience and reforms built  around the
“Taiwanese community” and a national future to be constructed, and, on the other, a
return to the political and national formulae brought by the KMT and the refugees
from the mainland fleeing the Chinese civil war after 1945. In order to understand the
virulence of the reaction of the losers in the election in the weeks following the vote,
we must examine the course of an election campaign whose dynamics enabled the re-
election of a President who had been widely announced as beaten a year before.
The forces at work 
4 Officially opened 30 days before the ballot, the election campaign actually got under
way in February 2003, that is more than a year before the vote, with the decision by the
KMT and the PFP to propose a common list and present the two losers from the 2000
election,  Lien  Chan  and  Soong  Chu-yu,  as  the  candidates  for  President  and  Vice-
President.  This decision, a difficult one by virtue of the animosity between the two
candidates, had several consequences. First of all, constituting an electoral alliance and
a joint platform, whose fine-tuning took up most of the first half of 2003. Next, the
bringing  together  behind  the  single  candidature  of  all  the  conservative  forces  and
defending a “Chinese nationalist” ideology at the expense of the “pro-local”, that is
“Taiwanisation”  wing,  of  the  KMT.  Finally,  a  sense  of  a  guaranteed  victory  in  the
presidential election, on the basis of Lien and Soong’s aggregated 2000 score3, as well as
the opinion polls that gave, in the spring of 2003, more than 60% of voters’ intentions
to the joint candidature. The presidential election did not therefore merely put the
KMT and the DPP in opposition, but also what has been called the Alliance (Guoqin
lianmeng) or the “Pan-Blue” camp (blue being the traditional colour of the KMT) and
the  so-called  “Pan-Green”  camp  (green  being  the  colour  of  the  DPP  and  the  pro-
independence movements). 
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The Democratic Progressive Party’s expansion 
Sources: Central Election Commission (CEC), Taiwan, and Lianhe xinwen wang, Taiwan.
5 The Alliance represented more than the simple addition of the KMT and the PFP. It
encompassed  the  circumstantial  reunification  around Lien  and  Soong  of  the  whole
galaxy of pan-Chinese ideological undercurrents that sprang from the KMT, and who
were excluded from or on bad terms with the party’s leadership in the Lee Teng-hui era
by dint of their opposition to Lee’s policy of Taiwanisation of the Republic of China.
This was first of all the case for the PFP of Soong Chu-yu, who, coming out of the KMT,
had run as an independent candidate for the 2000 presidential election against Lien
Chan, the KMT’s candidate supported by Lee Teng-hui, on a populist and explicitly pan-
Chinese and anti-Lee platform. Former governor of  the province of  Taiwan,  who is
charismatic  and  very  popular,  particularly  on  account  of  his  rather  client-based
management of provincial funds, Soong obtained more than 36% of votes, losing by just
2.5 % to Chen Shui-bian, and humiliating Lien Chan whose score barely exceeded 23%4.
He  then founded the  PFP  with  defectors  from the  KMT,  in  large  part  mainlanders
representing  the  most  “Chinese  nationalist”  faction,  careful  to  appoint  as  Vice-
President of the party his 2000 running-mate, Chang Chao-hsiung, a “born-and-bred
Taiwanese” from Kaohsiung. 
6 Also included in the Alliance was the New Party (NP), the first party to have emerged
from a split in the KMT in 1993 and the one most ideologically associated with the
principle of reunification with China. Practically wiped off the political map in the 2001
legislative elections, most of its former leaders going to teach or work in the People’s
Republic5, the NP nonetheless managed to survive in the shadow of the KMT and the
PFP, particularly thanks to its elected members in the Taipei Municipal Council and to
Taipei’s KMT Mayor Ma Ying-jeou6. Finally, we find in the blue camp the former 1996
presidential candidates, also ex-members of the KMT and anti-Lee, like Lin Yang-kang,
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Hau Po-tsun and Chen Lu-an, and their networks, which are sometimes very active, in
the military and business circles with relations with China.
7 The green camp is composed, apart from the DPP, of the Taiwanese Solidarity Union
(Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng, TSU). This political party, created at the time of the 2001
legislative elections, sprang out of a new split in the KMT, this time caused by members
of the “pro-local” faction responding to the call of former President Lee Teng-hui, who
was disappointed by the pro-China turn taken by the KMT under the leadership of Lien
Chan after the 2000 defeat. With Lee as its spiritual father, the TSU set about defending
a more radical programme than the DPP, the central planks of which were a fast-track
path  to  independence,  the  international  recognition  of  the  name  Taiwan  and  the
breaking off of any political or ideological link with China. The TSU also militates for
the defence of the interests of the Taiwanese lower middle classes (farmers, fishermen,
workers, artisans, etc.) in the context of the speeding up of industry relocation to China
and the opening up to the imports of cheap Chinese goods following Taiwan’s accession
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
8 The KMT-PFP alliance was set up to avoid the fratricidal division that allowed Chen’s
election in 2000, and to ground the legitimacy of his return to power, in contrast to the
reduced power of a President elected with fewer than 50% of votes, as was the case for
Chen. For Chen and the DPP, which never won more than 40% of the vote in a national
election, the re-election was also made much more difficult. Based on the 2000 results,
the blue camp clearly began 2003 in a very strong position, even if, by virtue of Lee
Teng-hui’s going over to the green camp, the votes mustered by Lien Chan in 2000 were
perhaps  not  altogether  vouchsafed.  The  objective  of  both  camps  then  would  be  to
convince the 20% of electors in the centre, who are often not very politicised, to vote
for them, while consolidating their respective electoral bases (about 40% of votes each).
9 The general frame of the campaign was thus laid down as early as the spring of 2003.
However, it was not until the end of the summer that the political debate began in
earnest. Previously, a long lead-up campaign gave the opportunity to both camps to
test their programmes. The campaign gradually mounted in intensity with the launch
of the main election themes, then really got under way with the trip by President Chen
Shui-bian  to  the  United  States  at  the  beginning  of  November.  We  will  make  an
assessment of  both camps’  programmes on the eve of  this  trip,  before tackling the
themes and the dynamics of the campaign.
The blue camp’s initial strategy 
10 In  mid-August  2003,  a  regional  by-election  held  in  Hualien  gave  both  camps  the
opportunity to test their strength and took on the appearance of a dress rehearsal for
the  presidential  election.  In  spite  of  the  atypical  political  situation  in  Hualien,  the
striking victory of the pan-blue candidate appeared, in the eyes of the KMT and the
PFP, to successfully test their alliance and validate their campaign programme. From
then on, both the programme and strategy for the presidential election were set in
stone  around a  radical  critique  of  the  DPP government  in  every  sphere  (economy,
relations with China, social and administrative policies, etc.). This critique was based
on two points;  the first  was the economic crisis  that  hit  Taiwan beginning in 2001
following the American and international recession, and on the rather general feeling
that the Chen government had not done enough to improve the situation; the second
was  the  stigmatisation  of  the  incompetence  of  the  Chen  administration  and  its
provocative stance on China that resulted in economic and political  instability.  The
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picture  painted  by  the  Alliance  of  Chen’s  four  years  in  power  is  one  of  economic
decline,  social  and  human  misery,  and  political  adventurism,  associated  with  an
attitude of neglect verging on the revolutionary towards due administrative process in
institutional and constitutional matters. By contrast, the competence and experience,
the past proven administrative qualities and the concern for the political and economic
stability  of  the  KMT  and  its  allies  would  guarantee  the  prosperity  and  security  of
Taiwan. The pan-blue’s programme therefore invited to bring back the glory days of
the KMT and of Taiwan―the years of enrichment and rapid industrialisation of the
1970s and 1980s―through the simple return to power of the former team. Logically
speaking, the Alliance’s campaign began with the glorification of the former president
Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, who was put forward as the new father
of a rich and modern Taiwan.
11 While the strength of this strategy was to take advantage of the government’s mistakes
and the deep concerns of  the Taiwanese faced with economic crisis,  as  well  as  the
widespread  perception  of  a  higher  level  of  competence  among  the  KMT  elite  in
administrative and the economic matters, it had many weak points that would quickly
come to light. 
12 First of all, finding nothing positive in four years of DPP administration, the blue camp
set everyone against it who had taken part in the state’s reform programme and the
policies of economic revival developed in conjunction with business circles and social
groups. Moreover, in spite of a very marked drop in growth and real difficulties in the
employment sector during 2001-2002 (unemployment jumping to 5.3 %), these past four
years have not appeared as a descent into hell to the majority of the population. This is
particularly  so  of  the  younger  generation whose  freedom of  action and values  has
never been as great, and whose memory of the KMT’s “good management” is fuzzy and
more  linked  to  the  corruption  scandals  that  have  tarnished  its  reputation.  This
generation represented a million new voters with respect to 20007. In addition, the KMT
and the PFP have a majority in Parliament; their systematic opposition to the measures
and policies of the government has seemed to many as being one of the important
causes of the lack of an effective programme of economic renewal. The assessment of
the Chen government’s failings is thus more measured among the population than the
pan-blue campaign would have us believe.
13 The next point is that the criticism of the economic achievements of a government
tended to backfire as soon as there was a sign of an improvement in the economy,
which is  exactly what happened in summer 2003 on the twin fronts of  growth and
unemployment.  The  choice  of  blaming  the  DPP  alone  and  of  refusing  to  take  the
international recession into account, as well as the structural dependence of Taiwan on
the global market thus gave all the credit for the return of growth to the government. 
14 Finally, the choice of looking first and foremost to the governmental and ideological
model  of the  Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK)  years  implied  the  complete  scrapping  of  the
legacy of  the 1990s,  that  is,  the Lee Teng-hui  years.  In  the eyes  of  the majority  of
Taiwanese,  however,  it  was  not  the  CCK  period,  but  much  more  the  years  of
democratisation and “localisation”, that is of the rise in the power of local Taiwanese
elites who speak Taiwanese, rather than the elites who had come from the mainland
after 1949. This choice of the Alliance logically stemmed from its make-up and outlook.
The restructuring of the KMT around Lien Chan and an orthodox ideological line after
his defeat in 2000, as well as the tactical rapprochement with Soong for the elections,
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were objectively based on a rejection of Lee Teng-hui’s politics and his years in power8.
The  problem  is  that  this  line  came  into  conflict  with  another  part  of  the  KMT’s
discourse which, on the one hand claimed to have fathered the democratisation of the
regime and  the  country—forcefully  imposed,  nonetheless,  under  pressure  from the
population as well as from the DPP, by Lee Teng-hui on that same old guard of the party
maintaining  allegiance  to  Chiang  Ching-kuo—and,  on  the  other  hand,  wished  to
promote its Taiwanese character and its policy of localisation, that is to say, once again,
the Lee heritage. While for Soong and the PFP, Lee’s disavowal was not too damaging by
dint of the power struggle that opposed them from the mid-1990s onwards. It was even
less  so  for  the  New Party  that  saw in  it  an  ideological  victory.  It  was  much more
dangerous  for  Lien  Chan,  Lee  Teng-hui’s  ex-prime  minister  (1994-1996)  and  vice-
president (1996-2000). Whereas Lee’s support for independence became more radical,
the impossibility of  claiming credit  in any credible way for the legacy of  the 1990s
would foster the feeling that the pro-Taiwanese discourse of the KMT was a patchwork
of empty slogans masking a return of the mainlanders to power and of the ideology of
unification with China. Similarly, the KMT’s repeated affirmation of its attachment to
democracy was to counter the slogans glorifying the CCK years, but also to its inability
to dissociate itself from the old guard and the party’s authoritarian past symbolised by
Soong and by the reappearance around the Alliance of the most orthodox conservatives
in the old KMT and the NP9. 
15 The  Blues’  campaign  consisted  in  attacking  the  candidate  Chen  Shui-bian  and  his
administration by all possible means―not only politically and economically, but also
morally and personally―, and in promoting the competence of the KMT-PFP in order
to ensure the well-being of the population. The fundamental contradictions in their
discourse  would,  however,  jeopardise  their  chances  as  soon as  the  electoral  debate
went from a critique of the Chen government’s policies to questions of identity and
constitutional changes.
The green camp’s initial strategy
16 At the start of the election campaign, the DPP and Chen knew that the political and
economic situation was against them. The alliance between Lien and Soong forced Chen
to obtain 50% of the votes, that is 10% more than in 2000, if he was to be re-elected. In
the face of this challenge, the Greens’ strategy was simple: to have people forget the
mistakes  and  inexperience  of  the  administration  by  playing  on  the  traditional
strengths of the green camp (democracy, Taiwanese identity, listening to the people),
promote the pursuit of the reforms begun during the first term of office, and discredit
the blue camp’s candidates and discourse by associating them with the dictatorial, anti-
Taiwanese and corrupt past of the old KMT. This led to a dual campaign: a national one
proposing new ideas in line with the old attacks on the blue camp, and a multitude of
local  micro-campaigns designed to  muster  as  many votes  as  possible.  The “mission
impossible” of increasing the number of green votes by 10% was to be translated into
objectives quantified in terms of votes to be garnered for each circumscription, city,
town,  village  and  district  throughout  the  country,  but  especially  in  the  south,  a
traditional  bastion  of  pro-independence  supporters,  and  the  Centre,  where  the
government’s  generous  policies  of  economic  and  cultural  development  had  offered
fertile ground for the past four years.
17 The DPP was to be supported in that by the Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwan Solidarity Union
(TSU), which threw the whole of its networks and resources into the battle for Chen’s
Taiwan. The Birth of A Nation?
China Perspectives, 53 | May- June 2004
6
re-election. The TSU was even to play the role of catalyser of the most radical pro-
independence forces,  offering the DPP the opportunity of  putting itself  back at  the
centre of the political stage and putting on a more moderate face likely to attract a
broader  electorate.  Beginning  in  the  spring  of  2003,  the  TSU  prepared  a  series  of
demonstrations  to  demand  an  official  name  change  of  the  Republic  of  China  into
“Taiwan”  and  a  revision  of  the  Constitution.  The  outbreak  of  SARS  (Severe  Acute
Respiratory Syndrome) forced it to put off these activities until September, but SARS
was also to give grist to the independence mill. The epidemic, the circumstances of its
being spread from China, the secrecy surrounding it that was maintained for the first
few  months  by  the  authorities  in  Peking,  and  China’s  refusal  to  authorise  official
contacts between Taiwan and the World Health Organisation (WHO) were to remind the
population,  after  a  recent  period  of  infatuation  with  Shanghai  and  the  Chinese
economic miracle, the risks implicated by the Chinese communist system, as well as
China’s contempt for the well-being of Taiwanese and Chinese alike10. 
18 This anti-China sentiment in a scared population that was housebound for nearly two
months gave the DPP the opportunity to bring back one of the main planks of the pro-
independence platform to the fore: the holding of referenda to enable the population to
express its views directly on government policies and the great national objectives. On
May 20th, Chen Shui-bian broadcast his wish to organise a referendum on Taiwan’s
accession to the WHO at the same time as a presidential election. For that, Parliament,
which was controlled by the KMT-PFP opposition, had to pass a law. Therefore, during
2003, the passage of the law on referenda became one of the principal hobbyhorses of
the DPP.
19 The  second  theme  put  forward  by  the  green  camp  was  the  setting  up  of  a  new
Constitution. This idea, which had been tried out during the summer by the DPP, took
on greater force after the unexpected success of the September 6th demonstration for a
name  change  for  Taiwan.  Organised  by  the  TSU  and  bringing  together  more  than
200,000 people, this demonstration was the occasion for Lee Teng-hui to call for a new
Constitution for 2008. On September 28th, Chen Shui-bian announced the objective of
introducing a new Constitution by referendum in 2006 and its implementation in 2008. 
20 The third plank in the Greens’ campaign consisted in systematically discrediting the
KMT. The DPP strived to undermine the credibility of the blue camp through constant
revelations of malpractice and refusal to make amends for the political and economic
injustices of the years of KMT dictatorship. Without denying the competence of the
administrators in the blue camp, that it  had tried for four years to entice into the
government  (with  some  modest  success),  the  DPP  wanted  to  emphasise  that  the
political  leaders  of  the  blue  camp  remained  corrupt  and  that  they  had  made  no
distinction  between public  and  private  funds.  The  attacks,  very  often  ad  hominen,
concentrated on the KMT and its leaders getting rich at the expense of the nation, and
on the suspicious origins of the immense family fortune that Lien Chan had amassed
since the 1950s, given that he had been, as his father before him, a top bureaucrat all
his life11.
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Geographical distribution of votes (%)
Source: Central Election Commission (CEC), Taiwan.
21 A few weeks after the defeat of its candidate in the Hualien by-election, the green camp
thus also laid out the three central planks of its campaign. These were a referendum, a
new Constitution and a rejection of the corrupt rule of the KMT, all themes that would
enable it to get the election debate away from assessments of government performance
and put it back on the questions of choice about identity and policy. From then on, the
dynamics of the election campaign were to go from the blue camp to the green camp,
and the agenda would be almost entirely set  by the DPP.  Chen Shui-bian’s  and Lee
Teng-hui’s  superior mastery of the art of politics led to the situation where all  the
themes that the blue camp wished to avoid were precisely those that the DPP had put at
the core of its election strategy and were also those that would resonate with voters.
The campaign strategy of the Blues, worked out and applied in a quasi technocratic
way,  forgetting  the  idealistic  dimension  of  any  political  campaign,  and  relying  on
nationalistic  affinities  and  identifications  out  of  step  with  changes  in  people’s
mentality, would very quickly run aground. The blue candidates were to spend their
time glued to the DPP campaign, especially after Chen Shui-bian’s trip to the United
States.
Chen’s trip to the United States and the pan-blue’s turn-around 
22 The trip made by President Chen Shui-bian to the United States at the beginning of
November 2003 represented a major turning point in the campaign. This was a non-
official  trip—Washington’s  Chinese  policy  not  allowing  otherwise—and the  six  days
spent by Chen on American soil were formally regarded as being a mere stopover by
the Taiwanese President on his way to paying a visit to his diplomatic allies in Central
America. However, the awarding of the 35th International Human Rights Prize to Chen
by the International League of Human Rights at a ceremony in New York, in the course
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of which he was allowed to make a public address, but also the length, number and
importance of his stopovers (New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Alaska), as well as the
welcome given by top dignitaries in both the American executive and Congress, made
this trip the most successful, the most “official” and the most widely covered by the
media of any Taiwanese leader since 1979. Following on from a series of contacts and
trips  by  ministers  and  officials  in  the  military,  diplomatic  and  economic  spheres
between Taiwan and the Unites States, it gave the impression of Washington’s total
support for Taiwan and even more for President Chen and his policies of democratic
reform12.
23 The most  obvious repercussion of  the success  of  this  trip was the spectacular  turn
around of the KMT-PFP alliance on the three major issues of the referenda, the revision
of  the  Constitution  and  relations  with  China.  All  through  the  summer  and  the
beginning of autumn, Lien Chan and the political machine of the KMT had radically
rejected and ridiculed the DPP’s ideas on these matters. In November, however, they
took them on as their own to the point of outbidding its rival. On November 12th, for
the first time Lien Chan supported the holding of a referendum and the passing of a law
to this effect. On November 15th, he proposed a three-stage revision of the Constitution
of the Republic of China, leading to a new Constitution as early as 2005. At the same
time, Lien Chan, and even Soong Chu-yu, made a series of announcements concerning
relations with China. First of all recalling their rejection of Peking’s proposed model of
“one  country,  two  systems”  (yi  guo  liang  zhi),  and  of  any  relinquishing  of  the
sovereignty of the Republic of China over Taiwan, and even over China, in any possible
negotiations with Peking. They then explicitly rejected Peking’s “one China principle”.
Lien Chan and Wang Jin-pyng, the campaign director for the Blues, even went as far as
to publicly recognise the reality of the existence of a state (if not a country) on either
side of the Strait, thereby directly echoing Chen Shui-bian’s formula (yi bian yi guo)13.
24 The reason for such a change does not lie only in Chen’s successful trip to the United
States. Besides Washington’s support for the democratic reforms, in the logic of the
Bush administration’s  global  foreign policy,  the  KMT became aware  that  the  DPP’s
proposals had broad agreement among the population to the extent of beginning to tip
the electoral scales. As proof, the first opinion polls giving Chen as the winner in the
presidential  election came out  in November.  From that  moment on,  the blue camp
would run behind the DPP to prove its attachment to Taiwan and democracy. What
should have been a campaign on the government’s performance became a competition
in identification with Taiwan and love of the motherland. The only problem was that
for the KMT, and even more so for the PFP and the NP, the motherland is China, albeit a
non-communist China.
25 The  new  explicitly  pro-Taiwan  discourse,  copied  from  the  programme  of  the  DPP,
clearly showed the impasse in which the blue camp’s strategy, like its ideology, found
itself in the middle of the campaign. The Pan-Blues probably had no choice. At the start
of  December,  an  opinion  poll  conducted  by  the  Zhongguo  shibao  (China  Times)
indicated  that  the  number  of  Taiwanese  who  considered  themselves  to  be  solely
Taiwanese reached 50% for the first time, as against 38% who considered themselves to
be Taiwanese and Chinese, and 9% Chinese only14. In these circumstances, to carry on
with an overtly pro-Chinese policy and campaign, one centred on a return to a pre-Lee
Teng-hui past, would have been tantamount to political suicide. However, having both
a pro-Taiwan discourse and one that advocated rapprochement with China based on a
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pan-Chinese ideology could not but give an impression of confusion and publicise the
factional fighting between the Taiwanese way and the Chinese way within the blue
camp. Finally, the major consequence of the Alliance’s turn-around on national and
constitutional questions, of which its leaders were perhaps not immediately aware, was
the final  legitimisation of  the DPP policy and its  pro-independence line among the
majority of the population. 
26 It is possible, however, to think that the KMT’s public reversal was above all an election
tactic  of  Lien  and  Soong  that  in  no  way  called  into  question  the  principles,  still
intangible  ones,  of  the  “Chinese  nationalist”  platform  of  any  likely  pan-blue
government. A certain number of factors seem to give credence to this view. Indeed,
with the exception of parliamentary Speaker, Wang Jin-pyng, a rather consensual and
self-effacing character, the campaign of the blue camp did not make any significant call
on its pro-local wing. Vincent Siew (Hsiao Wan-chang), the first vice-president of the
KMT, was one of those most notably absent. Generally speaking, the Alliance made little
of the propositions and ideas stemming from the Taiwanese faction except in case of
emergency, and one may wonder whether this was not done reluctantly15. 
 
Lian Chan on the campaign trail
© GIO
27 The blue camp’s election strategy was thus based on four leaders each having their own
list  and public:  Lien Chan,  with his  image as  an austere  and competent  traditional
leader,  a  future  President  above the in-fighting and one with Taiwanese roots;  the
populist and provocative Soong Chu-yu drew in the older mainland generations and his
personal  clique;  Ma  Ying-jeou,  golden  boy  and  vice-president  of  the  KMT,  general
secretary of the national campaign, attracting the younger generations and the middle
classes in the north of the island by his seriousness, politeness, charm, and his legal
background;  finally,  Wang  Jin-pyng,  vice-president  of  the  KMT  and  member  of
parliament for  Kaohsiung,  a  symbol of  the pro-local  wing,  who was director of  the
national campaign with specific responsibility for the southern region. Three out of the
four were born in mainland China (Lien in Xi’an, Soong in Hunan province and Ma in
Hong Kong, the latter into a family of KMT notables who originally came from Hunan
province and passed through Hong Kong on their way to Taiwan).  The fact that,  in
common with most of the major leaders in the blue camp, they have recent mainland
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connections,  could not but confirm the popular impression of  a  KMT looking more
towards the past and China than towards Taiwan. 
28 Nonetheless  the  four  made  considerable  use  of  the  Taiwanese  language  in  their
speeches and interviews, and increasingly as election day approached. This is less true
of Ma Ying-jeou who campaigned especially in the North where the majority is made up
of  families  with  a  mainland  background  and  Hakkas,  and  who  could  not  speak
Taiwanese just ten years previously. Lien and Soong use Taiwanese more freely and
frequently, even if one can sense a certain unease in freewheeling conversations and a
tendency to resort to Mandarin to express their ideas with precision and conviction
(quite the opposite of most of the DPP or TSU leaders, beginning with Chen and Lee).
Although  Lien  Chan’s  family  is  originally  from  Tainan,  he  has  never  managed  to
convince people about the authenticity of his attachment to Taiwan, being, it is true, in
competition with Chen Shui-bian, a real “son of Tainan” and of Taiwan16. This meant
that Wang Jin-pyng was alone to carry the flag of Taiwanisation with conviction. He
would do it with strength and perseverance to the extent of calling into question some
of the implicit fundamental principles of the KMT. Going a step further than his boss,
Wang would therefore insist on the political necessity of the public and official use of
Taiwanese, and even of raising the independence of Taiwan as an acceptable alternative
for the future17. 
29 The tensions between Wang and the other leaders of the blue camp, particularly Soong,
came out in any case on several occasions, notably in Wang’s initial refusal to assume
the role of national election campaign director on the grounds of having doubts about
the  sincerity  of  Lien’s  and  Soong’s  dedication  to  the  well-being  of  the  population.
However, Wang clearly made all his declarations with Lien Chan’s agreement. He also
actively supported contesting the election results after March 20th, at the risk of losing
his reputation of impartiality in Parliament and his credibility within the electorate in
the  south,  which  confirms  his  loyalty  to  Lien  and  the  KMT.  We  should  probably
perceive the rhetorical differences and reversals therefore mainly as an electoral tactic
by the blue camp to harness the maximum number of votes possible, and especially in
order not to lose the “pro-Taiwan” votes of the KMT, yet without really giving up the
party’s Chinese ideology. To do so, as was partially the case under Lee Teng-hui, would
completely jeopardise the very foundations of the KMT as well as the support of that
section of the population that still identifies with China.
30 Thus, on the question of relations with China, the Alliance’s apparent turn-around in
favour  of  the  recognition  of  the  existence  of  two  states  should  not  lead  to  any
misapprehension.  While  the  “pro-Taiwanese”  faction  in  the  KMT  has  ratified  the
historical and political reality of the separation from China, and taken on board the fact
that the population’s identification with a purely Taiwanese identity has made constant
strides forward over the past two decades, the ultimate goal of the present leadership
of the blue camp, and in particular of the political apparatus of the PFP and the NP,
remains in the long term reunification with China and the maintenance of a Chinese
nationalist ideology18. In order not to put the KMT’s internal disputes on display and
show too clearly the gap between its programme and the views of the majority of the
population,  Lien  proposed  that  the  solution  to  the  questions  of  sovereignty  and
independence be left up to future generations and, for the meantime, avoided political
subjects in discussions with China concentrating instead on economic matters. He was
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consistent  in  maintaining  this  position  and  the  related,  albeit  unrealistic  one,  of
claiming the Republic of China as the sole China. 
The Referendum Law and the crisis with the United States
31 This electoralist  speculation has confirmation in the battle  to pass the Referendum
Law. This battle continued for more than six months—the DPP, in favour of a non-
restrictive law on referenda, and the Blue alliance, which, despite giving its support in
theory, first of all used its majority in the Chamber to reject any law concerning this
subject on two grounds. It was put forward that the public are not always the best judge
and that  decisions  should  ideally  come either  from the  people’s  representatives  in
Parliament  or  from  qualified  experts  on  the  issues  under  debate.  It  was  further
suggested that it would be a provocation to China. Given the massive support of the
population to the creation of the instruments of direct democracy as a complement to
representative democracy, and Washington’s acquiescence, in November the blue camp
changed its position. During the parliamentary negotiations, the DPP accepted ruling
out from any referendum the questions of the sovereignty, the name and the flag of
Taiwan,  in  exchange for  one article  (the  future  Article  17)  enabling the  holding of
referenda  on  national  security  initiated  by  the  President  in  case  of  threats  to  the
sovereignty of the country.
32 The law passed on November 27th was, however, very far from what had been planned.
To the surprise of all,  including Washington, the law that was drawn up and voted
solely by the KMT and the PFP, with the exception of Article 17 that the DPP managed
to get through, is extremely restrictive. Such as it is, it allows for a referendum only on
the basis of a petition backed by at least 5% of registered voters (that is more than
800,000), and after the subject has been approved by a specially established committee
the members of which would be a pro rata representation of parties in Parliament. This
law would seem to make any calling of a referendum for the presidential election by
Chen Shui-bian and the DPP impossible, and was therefore considered to be a major
political victory for the Alliance. Seen as a setback for the introduction of steps towards
direct democracy on Taiwan, the law was also welcomed as a victory by Peking. The
secret surrounding its preparation by the blue camp until the eve of the vote, and the
virtually  synchronised mix of  warnings and assurances expressed by China about a
favourable  outcome,  raised  moreover  the  question  of  the  degree  of  implicit
understanding between the leaders of the blue camp and the government in Peking. 
33 The battle  surrounding this  law reinforced the impression among analysts  and the
general population that the KMT and the PFP do not pay much heed to the wishes of
the majority  of  Taiwanese.  It  has  also  posed the question of  the limits  of  the blue
camp’s  commitment  to  democracy  and  political  and  constitutional  reforms,
highlighting the  essentially  electioneering character  of  its  initial  about-face  on the
issue of referenda.
34 The  fury  of  the  opposition  was,  however,  quickly  to  succeed  the  anger  of  the
government and the DPP at this “iron-cage law” following a political “coup” by Chen
Shui-bian.  Indeed,  Chen  relied  on  Article  17  and  the  presence  of  more  than  five
hundred Chinese tactical missiles off the Taiwanese coasts to call for two referenda on
relations with China and national defence to be held on the day of the presidential
election. The reasons for this decision were, on the one hand, Chen’s desire to maintain
the  constitutional  precedence  of  the  executive  power  over  the  National  Assembly,
whose cohabitation within a half-American, half-French style presidential system had
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been a headache for four years, and, on the other hand, the conviction that not only
would the referenda be an effective means of mobilising the electorate, but also the
presidential election might be the last chance for a long time―if Chen were to lose the
election―to  make  use  of  the  instrument  of  a  referendum  in  Taiwanese  political
practice.
 
Referendum results
Source: Central Election Commission (CEC), Taiwan.
35 In the process, the government unleashed a major crisis in relations with the United
States that lasted for more than two months and culminated in Bush’s public criticism
of Taiwan in front of the Chinese Prime Minister on a visit to Washington19. The poor
quality  of  communication  between  Taipei  and  Washington  over  the  matter  was  to
transform Chen’s “coup” into a kind of public relations disaster both internationally
and within Taiwan; and, by virtue of the importance of relations with the United States
in the Taiwanese political equation, give fresh ammunition to the blue camp in its all-
out critique of the government. 
36 The main bone of contention between Taipei and the Bush administration was not the
referendum in itself, but the fact that it was to be called on the grounds of an external
threat, leading to a belief that it would be about Taiwan’s independence, which would
risk bringing about a conflict with China in which the United States would be forced to
intervene.  Byron Weng has clearly shown that this  perception came from the idea,
generally accepted in the United States, that a referendum called by the DPP would
necessarily be on the independence of Taiwan, by reason of the former assimilation
referendum=independence by the political programme of the pre-Chen Shui-bian DPP,
but also because of Peking’s conception of any referendum as quite literally a casus
belli20. For the observers on the ground in Taiwan, this direct link was neither real nor
credible,  for  one thing by reason of  the opposition of  a  majority  of  the  Taiwanese
population to any provocative measure regarding China, and for another of the DPP’s
explicitly evolving position on this question. Ever since 1999, and the publication of its
Resolution  on  the  Future  of  Taiwan,  the  DPP  has  felt  that  declaring  Taiwan
independent by referendum serves no purpose, since Taiwan is the Republic of China
and that it already constitutes a sovereign and independent country21. 
37 It took the Chen administration over two months to calm the United States down and
convince it that it would respect its previous commitment on the non-declaration of
independence, thanks especially to the fine-tuning of the wording of the referendum
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questions all drawn up in collaboration with Washington, which made them decidedly
more moderate (see Table 3). By mid-February, the United States, through Colin Powell,
officially gave its consent to the referendum, thereby legitimising it again in part, at
the same time letting its exasperation show through22.
38 Chen’s recourse to Article 17 and the crisis with the United States allowed the blue
camp to stigmatise the push by a president with authoritarian leanings, to contest the
legality of using Article 17 in the absence of any war with China, and to present Chen as
an irresponsible and dangerous politician for the people of Taiwan. This episode, and
the atmosphere of political crisis fermented by the blue camp, were a serious set-back
for Chen Shui-bian, as the polls quickly showed, by putting Lien and Soong in the lead23.
Even if the legality of this recourse to Article 17 could not be easily contested, by virtue
of  the  freedom  of  interpretation  left  to  the  President24,  the  Alliance’s  strategy  of
boycotting  the  referendum  would  be  crowned  with  success,  since  only  45%  of
registered voters  would take part  in  it,  rendering it  nul  and void.  Among the blue
camp’s  leaders,  only  Wang  Jin-pyng  came  out  in  favour  of  participating  in  the
referendum25. 
39 Contrary to a widely held view, it is not at all sure that the holding of the “defensive
referendum” on March 20th really did Chen any good. Admittedly, Chen’s firm stance
with regard to Washington gave the impression of a President capable of standing up to
the strongest pressures to defend the country’s interests, or in any case those of the
independence  cause.  The  referendum  also  offered  the  DPP  and  the  TSU  a  great
opportunity to mobilise electoral arguments, allowing them to avoid a political debate
around the government’s performance—to the extent that in the last few months there
was more discussion of the referenda than the election itself. Conversely, however, the
“forced” side of the process, Washington’s annoyance, and the Alliance’s boycotting
strategy gave a real boost to the blues’ troops against Chen and what they considered to
be irresponsible provocation of China26.
Other campaign themes 
40 From November, the issue of the referendum acted as a phagocyte for the campaign.
Other  election  themes  and  events  had  their  importance,  however;  primarily  the
Constitution  and  the  political  reforms,  the  economic  programmes  and  financial
scandals, the personality of the candidates, and the large rallies that came at the end of
the campaign.
41 On  the  constitutional  questions  and  those  of  political  reforms,  we  find  the  same
situation for the referendum. Faced with Chen proposing the adoption by referendum
of a new Constitution in 2006 and its implementation by 2008, the blue camp was first
of  all  opposed  to  any  idea  of  any  constitutional  revision  other  than  simple
amendments, and this in spite of the recognised inadequacy of the present Constitution
to deal with the reality and needs of Taiwan. For the KMT, rewriting the Constitution
would amount to opening Pandora’s box. Yet, faced with the fact that a majority of the
population supported the political reforms and the DPP plan for a new Constitution, the
Alliance took a different tack by proposing an accelerated revision of the Constitution
for 2005, yet without giving many details or guarantees27. 
42 As to the political reforms that concerned in particular a reduction in the number of
members of parliament, a change to the electoral system whereby voting would be for a
single member, and the financing and economic assets of political parties, the Alliance,
while promising to give its support to the reforms, managed to block the adopting of
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most of these laws. The law on political and election financing was passed three days
after the ballot, preventing its application to this election. The blue camp, certain that
it would win, preferred to put off the reforms to a later date in order to be in a better
position  to  push  through  versions  of  them  that  would  be  more  in  their  favour.
Consequently,  before the election,  the blues  projected an image of  themselves  as  a
conservative camp little inclined to promote reforms.
43 In terms of economic and social programmes, both camps put forward such similar
proposals that it was difficult to see differences between them other than those that
were cosmetic or electioneering. This was the case in particular of the programmes to
stimulate the economy, on social cover and for the establishment of the “three direct
links” with China (santong) for which almost the entire Taiwanese political class, with
the  exception  of  the  TSU,  was  hoping  for  a  rapid  outcome  by  means  of  technical
agreements bypassing the political issues. While Peking let it be understood that it was
open to such technical solutions, its demand that its one-China principle be respected—
something that Taiwan as a whole is against—, flies in the face of Taiwan’s own demand
for  a  “parity”  of  status  in  negotiations,  and  leaves  little  hope  for  any  short-term
solution. Thus, although the rapid introduction of the “three links” was one of Lien
Chan’s chief slogans and arguments for his election, it is hard to see how his victory
could have speeded up the implementation of the “three links”, other than by Peking
favouring a party that shares its goal of an eventually united China. Chen’s optimism
about this is even more difficult to sustain.
44 On  the  theme  of  corruption  and  financial  scandals,  thanks  to  a  constant  media
campaign orchestrated by the Alliance and its allies in the press and the audio-visual
sector  on  allegations  of  embezzlement  by  President  Chen  and  his  entourage,  the
opponents of Chen Shui-bian and the DPP pulled off the feat of tarnishing their image
of probity on which they have built their careers. The blue camp did not, however,
come out of it cleansed of its corrupt image—Lien even joining Soong in the ranks of
leaders having lost all credibility as to their personal probity and their opposition to
“dirty  money”  (heijin).  It  succeeded,  nonetheless,  in  transforming  the  theme  of
corruption,  which had originally  been very favourable to the DPP,  into a  zero sum
game, at least for the duration of the campaign.
45 For its part, the theme of the personality of the candidates gave place to significant
abuses by the blue camp which, in its character assassination of Chen Shui-bian, ended
up publicly comparing him to Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Bin Laden. By refusing to
apologise to Chen for these attacks28, and by taking up these themes in its post-election
demonstrations  and declarations,  the  Alliance and in particular  Soong showed that
these abuses were part of a deliberate tactic to assimilate Chen to a dangerous dictator,
and  were  an  attempt—one  with  real,  albeit  limited,  success—to  overturn  classical
images of the Taiwanese political discourse. Thus, the KMT and the PFP were purported
to be the real democratic parties fighting for the people, and the DPP the dictatorial
party.  The  success  of  this  tactic  rested  on  a  particular  conception  of  democracy
dominant among pan-Blue supporters,  in part linked to their feeling of  having had
power stolen from them by Chen Shui-bian in 2000. In their view, given that Chen was
not legitimately, even if legally, President, and that he had a “majority” against him, he
could “logically” only govern in a dictatorial and populist manner. This conviction was
also fostered by the Alliance’s campaign on the illegality of holding a referendum that
was autocratically imposed to influence the election. Moreover, in spite of the fact that
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they  enjoyed  an  absolute  democracy,  a  great  many  blues  supporters,  mostly
mainlanders, felt their very existence and survival on Taiwan to be threatened over the
medium  to  long  term  by  the  pro-independence  discourse,  given  their  family
background. Talking loudly about “green terror” (lüse kongbu) and oppression of the
mainlander minority29, they were unable to grasp the democratic logic of giving power
to the majority, and the impossibility for the DPP (even if it wanted to) to put them
through what the Taiwanese majority endured through thirty years of KMT rule. Such
feelings  exist  even  among  the  most  reasonable  of  people,  and  during  the  election
campaign they were fed by the associations made by the DPP supporters between pro-
Taiwan,  pro-referendum democrats  on the one side,  and anti-referendum and anti-
democrat, as well as lackeys of Communist China, on the other. 
46 Finally,  the  campaign  was  marked  by  the  first  televised  debates  between  the
presidential candidates in the history of Taiwan and by two enormous election rallies.
Neither of the debates had any particular influence on the electorate according to the
polls, even if the media were in agreement in recognising that Chen made the better
use of this tool of communication, although Lien Chan did make an improved showing
in the second. As to the two big rallies, the first was organised on February 28th by the
DPP and the TSU to commemorate the bloody events of February 28th 1947 and to
celebrate Taiwanese identity and independence. Bringing together probably more than
two million people who formed a human chain from the north to the south of the
island, it gave the impression that victory was now a certainty for the green camp. The
second took place on March 13th and was the response of the blue camp. It was called
upon to show its strength and re-galvanise its troops demoralised by the success of the
greens  on  February  28th,  something  that  it  achieved  remarkably  well  by  bringing
together across the country crowds of a similar size or even slightly larger, calling for a
change of president.
The situation on the eve of the ballot, the assassination attempt and Chen’s re-election 
47 As of March 10th, ten days prior to the election, all publication of opinion polls was
banned. This prevented any assessment of the impact of the March 13th rally. The final
official polls, however, were indicating an uncertain outcome, the difference between
the two camps lying within a 3% margin of error30. During the days following March
13th, the blue camp announced publicly, however, that it had already won the election
and that the final gap would amount to 8%, maintaining the idea of a certain victory for
its supporters. The green camp was much more circumspect and declared a narrow
victory for Chen, the gap one way or the other to be, in its estimation, smaller than
120,000 votes, that is, less than 1% of the total31. The final week, marked by a noticeable
increase in tension due to the uncertainty of the result, was punctuated by the twice-
daily flurry of meetings of both camps which were to culminate in massive new rallies
on the Friday night in Taipei. However, the attack on the President and Vice-President
on March 19th prevented these final meetings from being held and, in the process,
meant that the final mood of the electorate could not be gauged.
48 The following day, March 20th, Chen and Lu narrowly defeated the KMT-PFP alliance
candidates. An analysis of the distribution of votes indicates that, with respect to the
2000 election, the green camp progressed in every region of the country except on the
east coast, and was a clear winner overall in the southern and central circumscriptions
and municipalities, at the same time as limiting the advance of the blues in the areas of
Taipei and Taoyuan-Hsinchu. In all, the Chen-Lu ticket increased its vote by nearly 1.5
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million. As for the blue camp, it was swept away in the south and overtaken in the
centre, but maintained its domination in the north. Its victory in the east carried little
weight by virtue of the small number of voters. The results of the referendum, though
with 90% support, could not be validated, on account of a lower than 50% turnout of
registered voters.
49 The perpetrators of the assassination attempt on Chen and Lu and their motives are
still unknown. The impact of this on the presidential election results is hard to assess.
The attack was a shock for the whole population and left a deep impression on Chen’s
supporters. It left the blue camp incredulous and somewhat indifferent, until it became
worried  about  a  wave  of  sympathy  capable  of  giving  an  advantage  to  Chen in  the
election the next day. By the end of the afternoon, rumours about a plot and a put-up
assassination  attempt  began  to  spread  before  finally  being  expressed  publicly  on
television by the ex-DPP pro-blue member of parliament, Chen Wen-chien (Sisy Chen),
from the KMT’s  campaign headquarters.  These rumours still  abound today and are
widely believed by the pan-blue voters in spite of their extravagant nature and the
evidence to the contrary given both by the police and American experts assisting the
enquiry32.  Chen  and  Lu’s  very  narrow  victory  margin  and  the  polls  showing  both
candidates running constantly neck and neck in the final weeks tends to credit the view
that there was no significant wave of sympathy in Chen’s favour.
The causes and consequences of Chen’s victory
50 Chen’s victory was above all  else a victory of  domestic and “national” politics.  The
electorate voted for a continuation and a broadening of institutional and constitutional
reforms that  would give a  greater  sense of  Taiwanese national  identity.  It  shows a
rejection of the Alliance platform, which looked rather like a restoration of the KMT’s
power in its most orthodox version. The KMT and the PFP, buoyed by their advances in
the polls during the greater part of 2003 and by the simple arithmetic of adding up the
votes won by Lien and Soong in 2000, believed that criticising Chen and presenting the
case for  a  return to stability  and a mix of  catch-all  measures and pronouncements
would be enough to put them back in power. In actual fact, the blue camp lost more
than 1,250,000 votes with respect to its performance in 2000. Its defeat was largely due
to its inability to grasp the changes to the country over the past four years, which is
moving increasingly away from the paternalistic and hierarchical social model of the
1980s,  but also from the pan-Chinese ideology of the blue camp. The strong strides
made by the green camp in the 2001 legislative elections should, however, have rung
some alarm bells. The rivalry between Lien and Soong for the leadership of the Alliance
and the subsequent power struggles feared by the population in case of their victory,
also probably played against them.
51 Nonetheless, Lien and Soong almost won—a mere 30,000 votes making the difference—,
so their campaign did convince nearly half the electorate. The reasons for this are first
of  all  the  force  of  Chen’s  rejection  by  a  part  of  the  population  attached  to  an
identification with China, and, the KMT image of being able to manage the economy, of
having administrative experience and of stability that reassures the middle and upper
classes. We must also bear in mind the attraction felt these classes and a section of the
younger generation, especially among female voters, towards the new guard of KMT
leaders, Ma Ying-jeou first and foremost, and the disillusionment with Chen felt by of a
part of the electorate after 2000. This disillusionment led voters to abstain, or vote blue
or cast an invalid vote, which explains the great number of such votes this time. The
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blue camp thus had managed to attract a certain number of former Chen voters who
were disappointed with the performance of an inexperienced government. 
52 Chen’s success then can be explained on the one hand by the important transfer of
votes that had gone to Lien Chan and Vincent Siew in 2000, at least in the order of 5% of
voters, who chose to remain faithful to Lee Teng-hui rather than to a KMT moving away
from the previous  policy  of  Taiwanisation,  or  who were disgusted by the  policy  of
systematic obstruction by the KMT and the PFP in Parliament. On the other hand, the
attraction of Chen and his programme has been important for the younger generation
born after 1975 which, Taiwanese born and bred or not, has to all intents and purposes
known  only  an  environment  of  democratisation  and  increasing  social  and  moral
freedom, and which identifies with Taiwan, not China, particularly in the south. Finally,
we should not discard the idea that the population was quite simply satisfied with the
government’s performance33. The fact that the opposite impression seemed to prevail
could  be  explained  by  the  continual  domination  of  the  pro-Blue  media  and  their
constant criticisms of the government.
53 The Kuomintang and the blue camp therefore remain a major force in the Taiwanese
political  landscape.  The  KMT,  even after  possible  new splits,  will  remain  a  pole  of
attraction for both the elites and voters at large. The undeniable charisma of Ma Ying-
jeou and other leaders of the second, even third generation of “mainlanders”, as well as
the mass of experts and people of quality gravitating around the KMT, guarantee it a
future, in so far as it will be capable of really taking the Taiwanese-turn it had been
reneging these past four years and of proposing real reforms that go in the direction
wished for by the population. In this sense, the blue camp’s defeat in 2004 is as much, if
not more, a personal defeat for Lien and Soong and their passé line than it is of the
KMT machine. If the KMT and the blue camp had put up other candidates, especially
Wang Jin-pyng and Ma Ying-jeou, there is no doubt that they would have won, even if
Chen improved on his 2000 score, which he probably would.
54 If not for a fusion with the KMT, the PFP is now likely condemned to the wilderness or a
more or less radical opposition. As the party of a single man, Soong Chu-yu, and an
ideology increasingly out of step with the population, it got all the votes it possibly
could from those in favour of reunification, and knows that it will never be able to take
power alone and based on this platform. Yet, it may still pose some problems for the
KMT. After losing the presidency for the second consecutive time, the KMT is now in
danger of losing votes in the legislative elections to be held in December 2004, by virtue
of the die-hard attitude of  Lien and Soong in their  contesting of  the results  of  the
March 20th vote 34. This attitude actually appeared to be more the refusal of a former
ruling class to accept that its regime has come to an end to be replaced by a new elite,
than the expression of concerns about democratic and administrative transparency.
The KMT will therefore have no choice but to return to a position that is closer to that
of the majority of Taiwanese, or else lose its pro-local wing and appear as a reactionary
party,  alongside  the  PFP35.  Conversely,  any  oversharp  turn  by  the  KMT  towards
Taiwanisation would enable the PFP to get back those KMT voters with a marked pan-
Chinese ideology. A KMT led by a Ma-Wang tandem and based on internal reforms is
thus a solution wished for by many. It would even allow hope of a return to a solution
of  a  “united and democratic  China”.  For  that  to  happen,  however,  Lien and Soong
would need to accept their defeat and retire, which is far from guaranteed.
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55 Finally, there is the possibility of a merging of the two, or even three, parties in the
blue camp by including the NP. A sea snake of Taiwanese politics for three years, a
possible merger would not settle any of the above-mentioned problems, however, even
if it could give the opposition a semblance of unity and perhaps a soft landing for Lien,
Soong and the present KMT leadership team. A great many ideological,  tactical and
factional snags could, however, prevent or limit the success and attraction of such a
move,  particularly  among  the  electors,  in  the  first  place  the  mutual  and  ongoing
mistrust  between the KMT and the PFP,  and the foreseeable clashes between “pro-
local” supporters and the pan-Chinese plank of the “new” party.
56 After the Chen Shui-bian’s victory and the turn-about of the KMT over the question of
relations  with  China,  the  pro-independence  option  and  the  continuation  of  the
separation with China under the lines of the present status quo have now been given
full legitimacy. In the semantic debate raging between Peking, Washington and Taipei
over this, the Taiwanese voters have chosen the line adopted by Chen and the DPP: the
status  quo  means  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  a  Taiwanese  state  that  is
different  from the  Chinese  one,  with  its  own specific  culture,  history  and  political
institutions, even if the majority of its population is of Chinese background. 
57 These elections also showed a clear rise in the feeling of Taiwanese national identity
which is likely to continue to grow in strength. This election was probably the last
chance  for  the  reunificationist  or  Chinese  nationalist  programme  to  assert  itself
through the ballot box. Peking, the KMT, the PFP and the NP have clearly understood
this,  which explains  the  violence  of  the  blue  camp’s  reactions,  unable  as  it  was  to
accept, not the election defeat as such, but the end of their view of the world, in other
words the end of their state as a country that was Chinese first and Taiwanese second.
On the other hand, this does not seem to be yet well grasped in Washington, either on
the Republican or Democrat side, probably because it brings into question the basis of
the bi-partisan policy of the United States towards Taiwan that has been in place for
thirty years.  The idea of  a reunification with China is  not totally eliminated,  but it
would now necessarily require either coercion, or the democratisation of China. But
coercion or military conquest would have huge international repercussions, and would
probably  also  mean the  occupation of  a  country  and repression by  what  would  be
perceived as a foreign power by a Taiwanese population that is already more than 95%
opposed to  the “pacific”  “one country,  two systems” model  of  reunification 36.  The
other possible path is through the democratisation of China, authorising the creation of
federal  or confederate constitutional  structures or structures along the lines of  the
European Union, ratified by the Taiwanese people in a referendum.
58 Another characteristic of this election campaign was the generalisation of Taiwanese as
a language in political speeches and discussions by all the political parties, including
the  PFP.  On  television,  in  Parliament  and  at  election  meetings,  Taiwanese  was
constantly  being  used  in  competition  with  Mandarin,  even  to  the  point  of  being
virtually the sole language used in the south and in some speeches by “Taiwanese born-
and-bred” leaders. This feature, which can only become more marked, is moreover one
of the factors feeding the insecurity and anxiety of those members whose families come
from the mainland, but also of those Hakka families from the north of the island, who
have  not  learned  Taiwanese  or  who  speak  it  badly,  and  who  feel  increasingly
marginalised by the changes in society, even in Taipei37.
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59 Finally, there seems to have been a general consensus favouring the setting up of the
“three  direct  links”  with  China  and  the  continuation  of  Taiwanese  economic
investments  in  China.  This  attitude,  which appears  to  be  in  contradiction with the
affirmation of Taiwanese identity, is the expression first and foremost of a pragmatic
concern to improve the competitiveness and the economic situation of the island, while
commercial exchanges with China, which have made a spectacular leap forward, have
become a major factor in this. It also expresses the ability to make a clear distinction
between  economic  co-operation  and  political  and  cultural  identity.  The  Chinese
strategy of appealing to the Taiwanese through the economic boom on the mainland
has failed. The activities of the Taiwanese in China have even, for some, strengthened
the feeling of a radical difference in “national” type between the two shores of the
Strait, in spite of their common cultural origins.
60 With  the  election  of  Chen  Shui-bian  as  President  of  the  state  of  Taiwan,  we  may
therefore wonder whether we have witnessed the penultimate step in the formation of
a new Taiwanese nation, with Chen as the “new father of the nation” to be born (xin
guojia zhi fu)38. In any case, now that he has been re-elected, Chen will have as his main
goal the rewriting of the Constitution and its implementation by 2008, while respecting
his repeated commitment to Washington and Peking not to tamper with the official
name, symbols or territory of the Republic of China. For Chen, the fact that Taiwan is
called the Republic of China, pending the democratisation of the People’s Republic, is
one acceptable compromise, about which the majority of Taiwanese seem also to be in
agreement. 
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